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Abstract: Datafication is not just the making of information, which, in one sense, human beings
have  been  doing  since  the  creation  of  symbols  and  writing.  Rather,  datafication  is  a
contemporary phenomenon which refers to the quantification of human life through digital
information,  very  often  for  economic  value.  This  process  has  major  social  consequences.
Disciplines  such  as  political  economy,  critical  data  studies,  software  studies,  legal  theory,
and—more  recently—  decolonial  theory,  have  considered  different  aspects  of  those
consequences  to  be  important.  Fundamental  to  all  such approaches  is  the  analysis  of  the
intersection of power and knowledge.
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INTRODUCTION
The term “datafication” implies that something is made into data. What that something is, and
what the processing comprises, are matters that need to be put into context. The term “data”,
however, is relatively clear, at least in its contemporary usage. Data is the “material produced by
abstracting  the  world  into  categories,  measures  and other  representational  forms [...]  that
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constitute the building blocks from which information and knowledge are created” (Kitchin,
2014, p. 1). While, in principle, any thing or process (from a sun or rain pattern, to a beating
heart, to a lesson delivered in a class) can be made into data, our focus in this short essay will be
on processes of datafication that create digital data out of human life. Since most writers on data
also care about what happens to human life, the term “datafication” has quickly acquired an
additional meaning: the wider transformation of human life  so that its  elements can be a
continual source of data. The beneficiaries of this are very often corporations, but also states and
sometimes civil society organisations and communities.
The term “datafication” was introduced in a 2013 review of “big data” processes across business
and  the  social  sciences  (Mayer-Schönberger  and  Cukier,  2013,  chapter  5):  “to  datafy  a
phenomenon is to put it in quantified form so that it can be tabulated and analyzed” (2013, p.
78). Datafication, the authors argued, involves much more than converting symbolic material
into digital form, for it is datafication, not digitization, that “made [digital] text indexable and
thus searchable” (2013, p.  84).  Through this process,  large domains of human life became
susceptible to being processed via forms of analysis that could be automated on a large-scale.
The dynamic that drives datafication as a social process then becomes apparent: the drive to
“render  [...]  human  behavior…  into  an  analyzable  form”  in  a  process  that  in  the  review
mentioned above was already called “the datafication of everything” (2013, p. 93-94).
It  was not  long before critical  perspectives on datafication began to appear.  As our initial
definition of “data” makes clear, data do not naturally exist, but only emerge through a process
of abstraction: something is taken from things and processes, something which was not already
there in discrete form before. Lisa Gitelman (2013) sums up this point in the title of a well-
known edited collection: Raw Data is an Oxymoron. Indeed, implicit in the very notion of data
(or what is given as fact, from the Latin data) are the notions of selection and transformation:
“data are [...]  elements that can be abstracted from [...]  phenomena” (Kitchin, 2014, p. 2).
Kitchin even argues that “data” should be replaced with another Latin term, capta—what is
captured—to refer to how, practically, data is harvested from life. José van Dijck, surveying
various  terms  that  emerged  around  data  processes,  also  offers  a  critical  interpretation  of
datafication as “a means to access [...] and monitor people’s behavior” (Van Dijck, 2014, p.
1478). She proposes that practices of datafication are becoming “an accepted new paradigm for
understanding [...]   social  behavior” (2014,  p.  1478,  added emphasis).  Such understanding
involves a vision of “processes of datafication as a new way of interpreting the world”. Pushing
the argument further, Shoshana Zuboff argues that what we are living through is a new stage of
“surveillance capitalism” (2019) in which human experience becomes the raw material that
produces the behavioural data used to influence and even predict our actions.
We can approach the study of digital data as a complex matrix of actors and structures, which
different  disciplines  can  help  us  analyze  at  multiple  levels.  In  terms  of  actors,  we  have
corporations, states, and various civic (activists, journalists, etc.) and even non-state (terrorists,
hackers) actors, all of which can produce, collect and analyse data for different purposes. Here
the focus can range from the big corporate players responsible for the bulk of datafication in our
lives—Facebook,  Apple,  Microsoft,  Google,  and  Amazon  in  the  West,  and  their  Chinese
counterparts Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent and Xiaomi)—to smaller players across what can be called
the “social quantification sector” (Couldry and Mejias, 2018), including hardware, software,
platforms,  data  analytics,  data  brokerage  firms,  and even spammers  (depending on which
country we examine, this sector has more or less close relations with how government at various
levels  seeks  to  extract  data  for  monitoring  its  citizens;  China  is  one  country  where  those
relations are particularly close, cf. Chen and Qiu, 2019). Datafication can obviously benefit some
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of these actors, but it can also be used to discriminate against others on the basis of race, class,
etc. (cf. Gandy, 1993; Peña Gangadharan, 2012). In terms of structures, data can flow within
various architectures which can include platforms,  services,  apps,  databases,  and hardware
devices. To make sense of this complexity, various research disciplines can help us zoom in or
out on different intersections of players and infrastructures. For instance, software or platform
studies  can  address  issues  of  technological  configuration  and  affordances,  while  a  critical
political economy approach can address issues of commodification and exploitation. Most of
these approaches attempt to  explain in  some way how big  data  is  “made” in  terms of  its
relationship to time, context, and power (Boellstorff, 2013).
Next, we consider the specific elements that make up datafication, and the perspectives from
which different disciplines have approached datafication’s consequences, with specific emphasis
on datafication by corporations for economic profit.
ELEMENTS OF DATAFICATION
The  production  of  data  cannot  be  separated  from  two  essential  elements:  the  external
infrastructure  via  which  it  is  collected,  processed  and stored,  and the  processes  of  value
generation, which include monetisation but also means of state control, cultural production,
civic empowerment, etc. This infrastructure and those processes are multi-layered and global,
including mechanisms for dissemination,  access,  storage,  analysis  and surveillance that are
owned or controlled mostly by corporations and states.
Put another way, datafication combines two processes: the transformation of human life into
data through processes of quantification, and the generation of different kinds of value from
data. Despite its clunkiness, the term datafication is necessary because it signals a historically
new method of quantifying elements of life that until now were not quantified to this extent.
The process of quantifying life itself requires various components and conditions. First, as we
already identified, it involves mechanisms of data collection. This can take many forms, but very
often involves an app or platform that collects wide-ranging data about users, aggregates and
analyses the data, and generates micro-targeted marketing data and predictive insights about
behaviours. Some platforms such as Facebook have acquired the power to incorporate links to
their mechanisms of data gathering within other platforms, turning Facebook itself in all its
manifestations into a ‘data infrastructure’ (Nieborg and Helmond, 2019). The process is then
monetised by using such data to sell products or services to the users, or by selling the data to
parties wishing to influence or persuade users towards various goals. But that infrastructure also
involves prior conditions: the condition of encouraging people to use the app or platform, that
is,  organising  their  habits  so  that  life  actions  previously  performed  elsewhere  (such  as
communicating with friends,  sharing cultural  products,  hailing a taxi,  etc.)  become actions
performed  via  the  app.  Even  more  importantly,  the  process  of  quantification  involves
abstraction via the process of turning the flow of social life and social meaning into streams of
numbers that can be counted. This form of abstraction involves many subtle transformations,
both cognitive and evaluative, as management theorists Cristina Alaimo and Jannis Kallinikos
describe (2017). The transformations of social life that are inherent to datafication are so many,
and so consequential for our orientation to the social domain, that Alaimo and Kallinikos write
of a “computed sociality” (2017, p. 177; see also Van Dijck, 2013, p. 5, on “platformed sociality”).
Even though these processes are relatively new, the basic idea of datafication—that the flow of
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human life could be converted into discrete data—has a long history.
DATAFICATION: FROM PAST TO PRESENT
Datafication is implicated in more than just social media apps and content sharing platforms.
The first domain of datafication was business, not social life. Even today, the amount of data
generated by commerce exceeds the amount of data generated by the datafication of human life
(Chairman’s Letter in IBM, 2018). Key areas of business, such as logistics—the management of
the flow of goods and information—have matured into complex practices thanks to datafication.
The monitoring of continuously connected data flows to organize all aspects of production and
distribution across  space  and time within  global  commodity  chains  could  not  be  achieved
without datafication (Cowen, 2015).
But there are many other ways in which aspects of the social world came to be counted or
quantified during modernity, as a way of making it more ‘legible’ for governing (Poovey, 1998,
chapters 2 and 7; Scott, 1990). One of particular importance is social network analysis, where
applications  of  network  science  to  social  domains  have  contributed  to  the  evolution  of
datafication.  Social  graphs and network visualisations have allowed corporations to extract
information from the flow of life for descriptive and predictive use, aided by the incorporation of
“smart” devices into these social circles (the so-called Internet of Things), which record not just
interactions between people, but between people and things, or between things themselves.
Issues of power permeate these apparently neutral forms of datafication. The reason derives
from the underlying way in which data is produced so that it can be counted. In a network,
nodes only recognise other nodes, and if something is not represented as a node it does not
exist. Likewise, a process or entity can only be represented in a network if it can be described in
terms of the relations that the network can count or process. Something that cannot be codified
as a potential network member cannot be accounted for. This process of nodocentrism (Mejias,
2013) is  similarly  implicit  in the social  modelling that  renders social  flux into data-driven
computer  processes  (Rieder,  2012).  When  such  schemes  are  applied,  the  result  is  the
transformation  of  the  very  ways  in  which  the  social  world  is  accounted  for,  as  various
sociologists have noted (Fourcade and Healey, 2013; Espeland and Sauder, 2007). The question
of who is doing this codifying of life into datafied realities acquires extreme importance at this
point.
Yet the effects of power that are intrinsic to datafication are often made invisible. Paradoxically,
much-used metaphors that equate datafication to other extractive processes help to further
obscure, not uncover, these power relations. Consider the saying that “data is the new oil”,
something that can be naturally extracted or mined since it exists in the “ground” of social life.
As  legal  scholar  Lauren  Scholz  notes,  this  metaphor  “sidesteps  evaluation  of  any
misappropriation or exploitation that might arise from data use” (Scholz,  2018, p.  2).  This
understanding of datafication as somehow a natural process is surprisingly common, as evident
in this sentence from an information booklet distributed by the UK’s Royal Society: “Machine
learning is a brand of artificial intelligence that allows computer systems to learn directly from
examples, data and experience” (2019, n.p.). The idea of direct learning from data is regarded by
many critical data scientists as mythical; it is part of a discourse which critical disciplines have
attempted to debunk, as we will see in the next section.
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CONTROVERSIES OVER DATAFICATION
Important controversies over social justice have emerged about how datafication is applied by
corporations or states in particular sectors (from credit ratings to social services) to discriminate
against individuals particularly from disadvantaged classes and ethnic populations (e.g., Gandy,
1993; Eubanks, 2017; Benjamin, 2019). More broadly, disciplines like political economy, legal
studies, and decolonial theory approach the social quantification sector’s work from different
angles, each drawing on critical data studies.
POLITICAL ECONOMY
Marxist critiques of data production have mostly analysed the power dynamics inherent to
datafication  by  focusing  on  a  traditional  interpretation  of  labour  relations,  looking  at  the
"labour" that users perform by interacting with digital media and generating data (Fuchs and
Mosco,  2017).  Outside  the  Marxist  tradition,  similar  critiques  of  digital  labour  and  data
production have emerged (cf. Scholz, 2016), while management scholar Shoshana Zuboff has
advanced the thesis that the large-scale collection of personal data by corporations represents an
aberrant form of capitalism (Zuboff, 2015, 2019). Common to these approaches is the fact that,
as a social process, datafication is linked to the generation of profit—whether through data’s sale
as a commodity or data’s incorporation as a factor of production (Sadowski, 2019, alternatively
formulates data itself as ‘capital’).
However, recent critical work on datafication looks beyond the idea of labour. One approach is
to consider the economic form constituted by the platforms across which so much data is
generated and collected. Platforms represent much more than a commercial label for computing
interfaces, as Tarleton Gillespie first noted (2010). They are a fundamental new kind of multi-
sided market focused on datafication, a market that brings together platform users who generate
data, data buyers (advertisers and data brokers), and platform service providers who benefit
from the release, sale, and internal use of data (Rieder and Sire, 2014; Cohen, 2018).
Another  approach  interprets  datafication  via  a  rereading  of  Marx  to  argue  that  the  most
fundamental  characteristic  of  datafication  is  not  labour,  but  the  abstracting  force  of  the
commodity, that is, the very possibility of transforming life processes into “things” with value
through abstraction (Couldry and Mejias,  2018,  2019;  Sadowski,  2019).  This  interpretation
frames  datafication  as  a  social  process  configured  around new relations  (“data  relations”)
designed to optimise the generation of data from social life (compare to Zuboff, 2015, 2019).
LEGAL STUDIES
Legal theory offers an alternative critique of datafication, arguing that datafication threatens the
basic rights of the self.  This is  already suggested in the first  sentence of the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR): “the protection of natural persons in relation to the processing
of personal data is a fundamental right” (Recital 2). The risks from the collection of personal
data for individual autonomy have been predicted for at least two decades (cf. Schwartz, 1999;
Cohen 2000). Legal theorist Julie Cohen in particular has argued for the importance of holding
onto the concept of privacy in some form as a defense versus the chilling effects of continuous
data collection and processing (Cohen, 2013). The processes of datafication are so wide-ranging,
however,  that others have raised questions about the usefulness of the term ‘privacy’  itself
(Barocas and Nissenbaum, 2014). In a world where datafication seems continuous and multi-
layered,  there  is  clearly  a  need  for  a  more  contextual  approach  to  the  norm  of  privacy
Datafication
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 6 November 2019 | Volume 8 | Issue 4
(Nissenbaum, 2013).
Lately, questions have emerged about the implications of datafication—and artificial intelligence
based on processing data—for the concept of autonomy (Hildebrandt, 2015). The datafication
enabled by things like self-tracking devices, psychometric algorithms, and workplace tracking
systems arguably interferes with the minimal integrity of the self as a self (Couldry and Mejias,
2019), which can be understood as the very basis of autonomy. Similar concerns have been
expressed in terms of attempts by marketers and others to influence behaviour through data
analytics (cf. Rouvroy, 2015, on “data behaviorism”). This line of critique argues that we are,
through datafication, becoming dependent on (external, privatised) data measurements to tell
us who we are, what we are feeling, and what we should be doing, which challenges our basic
conception of human agency and knowledge.
Nonetheless,  datafication creates  practical  openings  for  proposals  for  regulation.  One such
opening revolves around the question of who owns the data. There are competing interests set
up by datafication, which means regulatory nuances have to be worked out. On one side, there
are the interests of the individual who generates data or owns a device that produces the data;
on the other, there are the interests of the owners of the infrastructure through which data flows
and is collected (the social quantification sector). The latter usually ask the former to forgo any
ownership rights to their data as a condition for using their infrastructure, sometimes framing
access to the infrastructure as a “free” service that offsets the surrendering of property rights.
Regulators, mostly in the EU through efforts such as the GDPR, are starting to intervene in this
relationship to uphold some minimal rights for the individual.
Legal critiques sometimes imply an even broader question: how is it that human life came to be
datafied—treated as an open domain for data extraction—in the first place (Cohen, 2018)? This
is better understood in a longer historical perspective, which decolonial critiques provide.
DECOLONIAL THEORY
If datafication within capitalism is a process of abstracting and extracting life across various
spaces to generate profit (with ancillary benefits for governments), then where does the wealth
generated by this extraction go, and why? In order to examine the geography and politics of
datafication (Thatcher et al., 2016), a connection to historical colonialism might be instructive.
Datafication can be understood as itself a colonial process, not just in the metaphorical sense of
saying things like “data is the new oil”, but quite literally as a new mode of data colonialism
(Couldry and Mejias,  2019) that appropriates human life  so that data can be continuously
extracted from it for the benefit of particular (Western, but also increasingly global capitalist)
interests.  Instead  of  territories,  natural  resources,  and  enslaved  labour,  data  colonialism
appropriates  social  resources.  While  the  modes,  intensities,  scales  and  contexts  of  data
colonialism are different from those of historic colonialism, the function remains the same: to
dispossess.
Within this wider perspective, datafication can be analysed as a continuation of the coloniality
of power (Quijano, 2007), a form of domination in both social and cognitive domains (de Sousa
Santos, 2016). A war for the social resources of the world is currently being waged between the
social quantification sectors of China and the United States, principally (Couldry and Mejias,
2019).  This  “land grab” employs a  whole arsenal  of  quantification weapons,  from artificial
intelligence,  facial  recognition,  and  new  e-commerce  models,  to  cyberwarfare,  chip
manufacturing, and multinational agreements regulating intellectual property. It is important to
recall  that,  historically,  information  and  communication  technologies  enabled  the
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administration and surveillance of colonised territories, as well as the propagation of narratives
that  legitimised  extraction  and  dispossession.  Datafication  continues  and  extends  these
functions.
CONCLUSION
The analytical value of the term “datafication” lies in its ability to name the processes and the
frameworks by which a new form of extractivism is unfolding in our times, via the appropriation
of data about our lives. Corporations are the main actors in, and beneficiaries of, this process,
with government in many countries having a strong stake in the process as well. Assuming that
the problem is not with data per se (there are indeed consensual community projects for data
collection), but with how and by whom it is systematically collected and used, a key question
becomes how to halt the social quantification sector’s expansion across social space. How do we
stand outside datafication, when it seeks to capture the entirety of social space and time?
The  term  datafication  itself  can  suggest  practical  ways  to  do  this.  By  naming  a  process
(datafication), we also invoke its limits. Just like the colonial project involved the separation of
the  world  into  centres  and  peripheries,  datafication  as  a  form of  rationality  also  creates
peripheral (or paranodal, cf. Mejias, 2013) things that cannot be quantified, and so, in principle,
cannot be datafied.
Various  forms  of  resistance—from  the  ineffective  but  strategic  opting  out  of  individual
platforms, to a larger awareness of ourselves as the objects of datafication—can contribute to
creating challenges and alternatives to the growth of  datafication.  Whether such resistance
becomes successful in halting certain aspects of datafication remains uncertain, but it is surely
one of the major social questions of our time.
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